Showing posts with label Chicomms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chicomms. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 23, 2011

Show me the way to go home

I’ve had an excellent experience this summer, however it is good to be back in the USA. China was a blast, mainly due to the kingly treatment I received from Haixiao and his family. I have seen things I hadn’t seen before and tried foods I never imagined myself eating. All in all, this summer has been one of the greatest of my life—the summers of my college years have always been that way. I wonder, is it possible for my life to top his one? That’s kind of the same way I felt after last summer’s trip to France and the UK (though the earliest part of the summer qualified as undoubtedly the worst summer in my life).

Still, reguardless of the wonderful times I’ve had, I think it is time to come back to the US. I could have stayed in Kazakhstan a lot longer I think, but I think I am done with China for a bit. Do not get me wrong, I had an extremely excellent time while I was there—but and this is a huge but, travelling in China is among the worst experiences in my entire life. I detest every aspect about it and can find almost no redeeming features—save that they did bump me to an earlier flight to the US avoiding a stop in Tokyo.

I guess I should back up a couple weeks and start at the beginning of my trip to China. I know that I haven’t kept this blog as I should have, but in my defense I haven’t been able to access the internet very much in China or in Kazakhstan. Whenever I could, the darn blogspot.com site never seemed to work. So here I am—extremely far behind, but enough of my excuses. Back to China!

I arrived in Urumqi early in the morning of August 7th or 8th. I can’t remember the date exactly, but I know it was too damn early. I think it was the 7th because I know I had been in the airport since the previous Thursday night, which was apparently the 4th. It was a long time to be stuck in airports waiting for flights. I got a little sleep before the other Yanks departed, but I spend most of my time chilling in a small, over priced café, which had the single positive aspect as it had a table near a wall source so I could plug in and charge my computer while playing or browsing the internet.

A quick aside: an odd thing that I have noticed is that overseas, wifi is free in airports, yet in the United States, you have to pay for it before you can use it. A damnable practice if I do say so myself. I was really looking forward to coming back to the land of the free and being able update my blog in real time and use that glorious social medium: facebook, which is banned in the glorious People’s Republic of China. Instead, I’m writing this note up on a word document so that I can upload this when I finally get home because I refuse to bay $7.99 for an hour and a half’s worth of wifi. Land of the free indeed!

Back to the main point of the story: travelling in China is stressful. Now some people are going to write this off just as travelling is stressful or travelling in foreign countries is stressful, however I think that’s not exactly true. I’ve travelled quite extensively for my twenty-two years, and quite a bit of it has been on my own. As for foreign countries—the majority of my travels have been to and from Kazakhstan or through Asia on my own and I can say that I’ve never felt more stressed or more ready to murder the people around me than in a Chinese airport or aboard a Chinese plane.

My stressful period really started once we hit the ground in Urumqi and I had to start filling out the forms to enter China. The agent seemed irritated with me because I forgot to put my middle name down fully—I just used the initial and I had not written in block letters (in my defense, it never said that I had to!). But what really set me off was that I had no idea where to go in this airport to get my connecting flight and I wasn’t sure anyone could speak English. I got into a line with everyone else, intending to ask where to go to connecting flights. Instead I waited for about 40 minutes, feeling more foolish by the minute as it became obvious that I had gotten into a line for vouchers to a hotel—which I did not need because I had a flight in only six hours and had to go through security again, so what was the point of going to a hotel? Not to mention I was under rather strict orders from Haixiao not to leave the airport because recently in Urumqi the East Turkestan Islamic terrorist organization had blown up a police station and Haixiao’s father didn’t feel that it was safe for me to be out on my own.

So in view of this, I decided that I was not going to leave the airport: partially because of the terrorist threat, but to be honest, I wasn’t that concerned that they’d hit a random American. I was more of a target of opportunity being Western, supposedly this group wanted to create an independent muslim Turkic state in Uigherstan, so I figured they were more after the Chinese. Mainly I was concerned about falling asleep and missing my flight or just having something go wrong and cause problems in China, a country of over 1.2 billion people where English was not a primary language.

Eventually I made my way to the front of the line and it seemed like my ordeal was over because the lady at the desk spoke a little English. I began to ask her which way to transfers when she interrupted me and asked for my ticket and passport. Unperturbed I handed them over to hear, only to have her stamp them and hand them back to me with a voucher for a hotel. I tried to tell her I didn’t need that as my flight was in the morning, only several hours away but she brushed me off and started working with the next person. A little annoyed at the impersonal treatment, I decided to shrug it off and find it myself—maybe there was an information kiosk somewhere I could ask.

No such luck—but finally I did find a sign in English which said “departures,” and while I didn’t know if they were domestic or international, it was better than nothing. I began to head up the escalator to find out, when a security guard working for the airport stopped me and I tried to explain what I planned to do. He didn’t seem to speak English and so brought over a girl who worked there. She saw my boarding pass, passport, and my voucher and motioned for me to follow her. She didn’t speak English either, but I really didn’t want to argue with the security guard. She took me out to a bus and my heart started to sink—this was the last thing I wanted. Then the bus driver took my suit case, threw in the storage underneath and slammed it shut. I didn’t seem to have a choice anymore so I got in and shortly afterwards the bus left.

My stress only increased as the bus drove for what seemed an eternity—probably more like 30 or 40 minutes, before finally stopping in a rundown looking neighborhood at a hotel with big glass doors. Everyone got off and handed their passports and vouchers to the ladies working at the front desk and got a roomkey. I was even more alarmed because the sign said that to have a single room was extra, which apparently meant I would have to share with some stranger. Then they took my passport and said they would hold it until the morning and that I would get a wake up call about two hours before my flight (which was at 0800 and it was currently about 0300). By now I was on the verge of panicking due to stress, but decided that I couldn’t fight it and so went up stairs and was glad to find that at least I had a room to myself and to cap it off, it actually had a functioning air conditioning unit (though I had to shut the window first).

Following a bit of advice I had gotten from my dad a long time ago when I was a patrol leader in the boy scouts—“Whenever you feel stressed or start to panic, just take a shower or wash your face, do whatever you can in the field. When you are clean you feel a thousand times better and can think much straighter.” This advice is probably one of the wisest bits that Dad has given me and I make use of it regularly. As usual it did help, at least a little bit. I decided not to sleep for the three or so hours I had left as I didn’t want to sleep through the alarm—I had been up for almost 48 hours now and wasn’t sure what would happen once I set my head down on an actual pillow.

The night itself passed rather slowly and uneventfully—except for an odd call I got at about 0330 asking if I wanted a massage. I made it back to the airport in one piece, though utterly exhausted. However, I was surprised to find that apparently the airport wasn’t open at 0630 in the morning, because there was a huge crowd of people standing in a gaggle at the doors. The people from my last flight who had had to go to the hotel (I learned later that this might be a requirement for foreigners who come to China) and I elbowed our way in—queues be damned. The Kazakhs I was with had no use for them and the Chinese responded with a zeal for ignoring someone’s position in line that was almost fanatical. If it weren’t for the people shoving me from behind, I’m not sure I would have made it into the airport at all.

Inside the crowds got even worse and I was lucky to find my check in area and get through security so quickly that I still had an hour and a half before my flight started boarding (nothing runs on time in Chinese airports, so my flight was about thirty minutes later than my ticket had told me originally). However, here at the Urumqi terminal was probably the most irritating thing which happened to me. It was breakfast time so I decided to stop at a restaurant hand have something to eat. It is really strange in Chinese airports because as you pass by the restaurants, the waiters will start calling out and shouting to try and get your attention. I ignored that and just ended up going to the nearest one to my gate, but the joke was on me. I ordered a bowl of noodles and some tea from the waitress (she had suggested it) and I didn’t look at the menu. Nor did I really understand how much RNB was worth—I exchanged my Kazakh tenge for RNB and so was fuzzy on the conversion. As I left, I got a bill for 360 RNB—now look, I knew it was expensive. There’s no way that a bowl of noodles and some tea couldn’t be at an airport. I also got the sinking feeling that it was a lot more expensive then I knew it should be. However, I had no idea how expensive it was. I figured it was maybe $20 or at worst $25. I had no idea that they charged me the equivalent of $60!

I didn’t find this out until later, after talking to Haixiao. I really can’t believe that I paid for that. Now I am not sure whether or I was just cheated by an unscrupulous waitress or whether that was the actual price. I did find out at another airport that tea could cost 350 RNB, so I suppose it isn’t a stretch of the imagination that the cost was correct, I just ordered stupidly. I was pretty PO’d about that, but nothing I can really do, lesson learned I guess. Don’t eat at Chinese airports unless you see the menu!

So that kind of shows you how frustrating my first experience in a Chinese airport was. The second one (second one by myself I mean, I flew with Haixiao and his father, and we got to skip the line and wait in the VIP area, so not too shabby) was on my return. It wasn’t quite as bad, but it still was rough. Firstly I had to find which terminal to go to, only realizing I was in the wrong one when I couldn’t find any delta flights at all and the signs for information led to nowhere—literally. The signs kept point and then just stopped with nothing there. I eventually found a customer service rep who spoke enough English to tell me Delta was in Terminal II, which I had to take a free shuttle ride to. First I had to find that, make my way onto it ( I was extremely worried I was going to have to fight my way through, but luckily no one seemed to want to get one with me—which made me freak out that I was on the wrong one…) and then wait until they’d let me check in.

I was fortunate that I got there so early, I had to wait about 3 hours until they’d let me check in at 0530, but at about 0500 they noticed me, told me my flight was overbooked and that since I was early, if I wanted to, I could go on an earlier direct flight to Detroit and make my way home about three to four hours earlier. I did so, got through customs without much of a problem and made it to the gate (which consisted of an exit to a shuttle to go to the airplane), and I was home free on an American owned and operated flight. Sounds easy right? Not so stressful?

Well, you’d be wrong because I left out two very important details. One is that part of the reason (a huge part) that Chinese airports are stressful is because of the people. Now look, I’m not trying to bash China—I had a wonderful time there, I really did, but I have to get this off my chest. I’m sure coming to America, Chinese people have plenty of things that piss them off about Americans. The fact of the matter is that in a country of so many people, it is bound to be crowded. I don’t like it, but I can understand and handle it. What really gets me stressed is more of how the people behave and I know I shouldn’t be judging them for it, but I can’t help it.

Chinese people are loud. Like extremely loud. As in, I can’t sleep because the people next to me sound like they’re having a shouting match while talking to the waitress about what they want to drink on the in-flight service. Or I have to push my headphones into my ear because the kids in front of me are playing some game which requires them to shake their hands while shouting the same thing over and over again at an increasing volume. And all of this is compounded by the fact that since I don’t understand Chinese at all, their language sounds like they are always very angry. It’s a very staccato (and I may be a little overly judgmental here), sharp, and plainly an ugly sounding language to my ears. There’s no poetry to it, it just sounds like people shouting extremely short words that end in a hard constantan (spelling might be off here, I mean the opposite of vowels) sound. So, I’m sorry if I offend anyone here, but that’s just how I feel.

I know for a fact that many other countries think that Americans are overly loud and obnoxious and I didn’t really understand what they meant. Now I guess I do, but to me it seems that Americans are comparatively much quieter than the average Chinese. I only really notice noise in America when someone is excited. In China, that’s just how people talk—when they’re ordering food or just saying “Hi”. I can’t really be mad at them for it and I’m not trying to say they are bad for it, but it still is irritating. Being alone in a very strange country where I understand none of the language and people are talking very loudly, it sounds like they are fighting. And one thing about me is that arguments between people really stress me out. Always has, unless I’m taking a side in it, but if I just hear two people having it out, I get nervous.

Someone might also note that American kids are probably just as noisy on flight as Chinese kids—and they may have a point. Even now as I write this on my last flight to Kansas City a baby is crying and giving me a head ache. But that’s a baby. I don’t ever recall having to suffer through kids at an older age (I think late elementary to early middle school) at all in the same way I did on that flight. And I cannot imagine parents letting their kids play such a loud and irritating game without giving them a talking to. But on that last domestic Chinese flight, it seemed like I was the only one irritated by it at all. Everyone else seemed to pay it no heed. I wish I could have.

Now the other thing that stressed me out has to deal with something much, much smaller. I’ve mentioned before that Haixiao’s family has treated me royally ever since I arrived. That’s an extreme understatement and I would love to pay them back anyway I can. Well, I sort of found a way to do it a little bit. Haixiao’s family is quite wealthy by most standards I think, and they want to make sure that if Haixiao decides to go into business in the United States, he has a firm starting amount to do so.

Now normally I would expect the parents to wire some money or transfer it to a bank account. But what would I know? The largest amount of money I’ve ever had to transfer was one or two grand to my parents to pay for something or as a loan—I can’t remember what. Haixiao’s family I think is in a much bigger league, because they gave him gold bars.

That’s right, honest to god, gold bullion. I have in my possession a 200g gold bullion bar which I am bringing to Haixiao because we aren’t sure how much he can bring himself (he took one with him already). The gold bar is heavy, but not very large. It’s about the size of my thumb. However, it is worth approximately $59.7 per gram. For those of you good at math, you will realize then, that I am carry around $11,940 or so in gold. So I hope you can see why I might be stressing out—and you can’t really blame that on China, but I was always afraid that when I declared it (I filled out the paperwork to, but I never found where I was supposed to do that in China, so I kind of just left and waited till I got to the US to declare it), I would discover I was in violation of some Chinese law and after waiting to find someone to explain in English, just how much trouble I was in, I would suffer the consequences of my actions.

Fortunately, as I said, the Chinese never had signs about declaration of goods and since I didn’t know where I was supposed to go, I kept going on. I guess I just assumed that eventually before I left the country I’d have to hit customs or something like I did at Kazakhstan and fill out the exit paperwork, but nothing happened. Instead, I got to America and then finally declared it. Now there my headache was rewarded as one Customs official looked at me like I was crazy when I told them I wasn’t sure how much it was worth and I was bringing it in without documentation as a favor to a friend (“Does that seem like a good idea to you?”).

Now I trusted Haixiao and so by extension I trusted his parents. However, his tone seemed to suggest to me that I was in a world of hurt. This feeling of dread was only increased when I was separated from the line with all the others and told to go into the further processing area. The other Customs officials seemed genuinely perplexed at my situation. They were less irritated with me and more amused with my “Ipod Gold.” They charged me $655…but later realized that bullion doesn’t require duties so they gave me my money back—Huzzah!

And thus ended the most stressful travelling experience of my life. China—it was fun, but I am not going back unless Haixiao comes with me to show me how to get through your damnable airports.

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Paper's are done and graded

Got an A on both the Kazakhstan and Korean papers.

Dr. Lee's wanting me to rework on the Kstan paper and try to get it submitted and published. This could be exciting. I've decided (for anyone interested) to post what I wrote on Korea (about the U.S.-Korea alliance).

If anyone's interested in seeing my footnates and scholarship, just give me your email address and I'll send you a copy of the full version.



The Korean-American Alliance:

Forged in Blood

Alexander T. Gerges

Summer 2009

Pittsburg State University


Abstract.

This paper is a general overview of the U.S.-ROK alliance, including aid in the Korean War, from before the outbreak of hostilities to the signing of the armistice. It will examine the successes, failures, and impact of the U.S. aid. This will include things such as the supplies and military training that the ROK forces received before the war, as well as the actual U.S. Armed Forces support in the war. It will also look at the problems that faced the U.S. military during the beginning of the war and how the U.S. military was able to overcome them and successfully help defend South Korean independence. Finally, the paper will also look at some of the difficulties the alliance has faced, how both sides have overcome them, and some speculation on the future of the alliance.


Introduction.

The history of the nation of Korea in the past one hundred and fifty years has been a period of extreme difficulty and sorrow for the people of Korea. From the political pressure and brutal occupation by the Japanese in the first half of the 20th century, to the division after World War II, the blood and destruction wrought by the Korean War, this period has left lasting scars upon the two Korean states. In the last forty years, things have improved greatly for people living in what is now the Republic of Korea, or South Korea, because of its enormous economic growth. However, the Korean peninsula remains divided with the people of the so called “Democratic People’s Republic” of Korea living under an oppressive dictatorship and in poverty.

In modern times, there have been three Korean Wars. Each time, foreign powers have fought in the Korean peninsula with destructive results for the Korean people. The wars that mainly led to the Japanese take over was the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1905[1]. In both wars, the Japanese were able knock out a potential rival for dominance in Korea and strip Korea of a possible protector against Japanese aggression.

Throughout Korea’s history, it had always maintained a close relationship with China to its north while treating with its neighbor Japan as more or less equals, despite two invasions during the 16th century. However, as Korea continued with its traditional rural agricultural society, Japan catapulted itself into the modern world through industrialization and military expansion[2]. On the other hand, Korea’s isolationism was forcibly ended by the major powers, including the United States, Europe, and Japan[3]. Unlike Japan, Korea was unable to modernize itself sufficiently to fend for itself.

With Korea’s possible protection in Asia removed from the equation and any possible help from western powers an ocean away, the Japanese soon made their move in Korea and without any serious outside force to back the Korean king, Korea fell under Japanese control the occupation included repression of the Korean culture and language and would help lead to the lasting division of Korea[4].

The U.S. really had not had planned to get seriously involved in Korea. Instead it became involved more as a way to check communist expansion in Asia towards Japan. The United States proposed a division of spheres of influence along the 38th Parallel, which the Soviet Union agreed. Had the Soviets disagreed, there was not much that the United States could have done, considering the fact that the Americans had no real presence in Korea, while the Soviets had an entire army in Manchuria[5]. Both superpowers supported governments based upon their own ideologies; the United States supported the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, under Dr. Syngman Rhee while the Soviets supported the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Kim Il-sung. Thus, began the U.S.-ROK alliance.

U.S. -South Korean Relations Before and During the War.

When the Korean War began, South Korea and the United States were not prepared for the struggle that lay ahead of them. The American troops sent to reinforce the South Korean army initially were badly under strength, poorly equipped, improperly trained, over--confident, and far too few for the task at hand[6]. Likewise, the South Korean military was unprepared and by the evening of the 28th of June, the South Korean army could only account for 22,000 of 98,000 men on the roll on the 25th. It had all but been destroyed by the North Korean People’s Army[7].

Similarly, the American task force sent during the initial weeks of the North Korean invasion was unprepared for the trail that lay ahead of them. On July 5th, 403 Americans of “Task Force Smith” had hastily dug in on a road between Suwon and Osan. The soldiers had grown soft from inactivity during their occupation of Japan and were under strength when sent to Korea. They were a token force, attempting to frighten the North Koreans into backing down, however it was unsuccessful[8]. The Americans were attacked by North Korean tanks and quickly overrun. The United States and their Korean allies had no anti-tank mines and were using obsolescent anti-tank rockets that could not penetrate the North Korean T-34s. This lack of sufficient equipment to stop the tanks coupled with rain that prevented the American air force from supporting Task Force Smith, led to their defeat and the task force quickly melted away[9].

Many people are unable to understand how this could have happened, seeing the current strength and power of the United States, often called the world’s sole superpower. Older people, or people more familiar with history might remember the perceived power of America in the immediate post war period and also struggle to reconcile the performance of the American army in the beginning of the war with the image of American power that people are more familiar. It is very true that the American army performed extremely poorly at the beginning of the war[10].

However, it may be this sort of image of America being an unstoppable superpower that led to the initial disaster in the Korean War. Americans at the time were exuberant at the conclusion of the Second World War. They also felt very secure in their monopoly on atomic weapons, economic, and industrial power and so believing that they would be able to rely on this, the American government dramatically slashed defense spending[11]. In 1945, the American military had twelve million men under arms and spent $82 billion dollars. However in 1950, the military had only 1.6 million men and the government was only spending $13 billion[12]. Thus, overconfidence in American’s status and power helped directly lead to America’s unpreparedness in the war.

Furthermore, Americans were unprepared for the situation in Korea and had not planned what to do with Korea after World War II and most American servicemen had no desire to serve there after hostilities had ended in 1945[13]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the U.S. had little strategic interests in maintaining troops in Korea and in the American government it was felt that Korea was not vital to the security of the United States, but a complete withdrawal would have hurt American credibility with Japan, which was vital for security[14]. Thus, a token force of about five hundred advisors was left in Korea to help train the South Korean military to fight a guerilla war going on in the southern region. In fact, the only real interest the American army had in Korea was for Korea to serve as a bastion of anti-communism. The military had grown suspicious of communism in the post World War II and it was hoped that the United States could fight communism in Asia by allowing South Korea to become a successful democracy, to serve as an example against communism[15].

American policy in the post--war would was clumsy, and while the American was hoping to use Korea as an example against communism, the State Department was pulling in the other direction. It felt that a unified Korea under non-Communist rule was unattainable and so wanted a way out; they also did not like Syngman Rhee, who had been able to take power with support from the U.S. military leaders in Korea. This action was done without the approval of the State Department, which did not want to be seen as getting involved in Korean politics[16]. The Rhee regime was repressive and an embarrassment to the United States. The entire situation in Korea was seen as volatile and dangerous with the top American commander in Korea recommending that the U.S. and Soviet Union simply both back out and let Korea settle its political ails and decide its future in its own time. He believed that involvement by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could only exacerbate things and create an even more dangerous situation[17].

This led to reluctance to support the Rhee regime and getting seriously involved in South Korea. Rhee was not a simple puppet; he was strongly nationalistic and vigorously denounced the American approved division of Korea. The U.S. government decided to limit Rhee’s ability to create “mischief” by denying his military armor or heavy artillery and other military equipment because they feared he might try to unite the peninsula through armed force[18].

The military that the United States created for the Republic of Korea was meant to fight a communist guerilla insurgency, which was aided and led by the North Korean leadership and controlled large regions of territory in the southwest. The primary training the South Korean army received was to fight these guerillas effectively and to end the outmoded methods picked up during Japanese occupation. The guerilla insurgency would last through the war, with American troops also having to aid the South Korean forces in fighting the insurgents. Thus, not only was the South Korean army ill-equipped to fight a modern conventional war, it was also untrained to a point which was not lost on Kim Il Sung when making his decision to invade[19].

The arrogance of the U.S. Government that communists would not try any aggressive actions in Korea because of the perceived strength of America and fear of America’s nuclear arsenal combined with the intention of preventing war by limiting the South Korea’s offensive capability was a recipe for disaster which threatened the very existence of South Korea. The five years of neglect of the U.S. military and the crippling of the South Korean military also almost enabled the Chinese and North Koreans to inflect wholesale disaster during the war. Since the Korean War is often seen as the first major test by communist powers against the West, it also can be argued that losing in Korea may have altered the entire course of the Cold War.

Luckily for both the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, once the North Koreans invaded in the summer of 1950, the U.S. was given a simple and obvious casus belli which then allowed them—with military support of the United Nations, to use force to counteract the communist aggression. Without this act of naked aggression, it is highly unlikely that the United States would have been able to marshal the popular support to continue the war to a satisfactory finish[20]. Another result that would be of great benefit to both countries is that the war turned “a very shaky relationship” into a direct military alliance and a mutually beneficial relationship that has stood the test of time and political blundering on both sides[21].

This war has been extensively written about in academic and American military circles, even if the war itself has been mainly forgotten by the public here in America and by younger generations in Korea. For older generations, especially in Korea, the war and the period afterwards still brings about memories and many American veterans of the Korean War who have visited Korea since the end of the war have talked about the gratitude they felt from the older Koreans[22]. So a brief overview is in order.

The North Korean People’s Army invaded the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950. This surprise attack caught the South Koreans and their American allies completely unaware. Furthermore, the North Koreans had infiltrated the South with Communist agents and they knew the location of every South Korean defense unit and then sent overwhelming forces against them. American advisors in Korea were also caught in a difficult position, because they were not sure whether or not they should fight alongside the ROK army, continue advising or withdraw completely[23].

The North Korean invasion was spearheaded by tanks and the South Korean army had no real means of combating them. Many South Korean soldiers threw themselves at the tanks while carrying explosive charges, but this had very little success and the South Korean morale began to shatter. The North Koreans also had Russian built aircraft, which it used against the South, who had no fighters. Seoul soon fell and the ROK army was all but destroyed. The United States was able to secure United Nations support for a joint military operation against North Korea because the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN at the time of the vote and were unable to help out their fellow communists. America was not ready yet to fight a major war; with only ten divisions and nine regimental combat teams, all but one were at seventy percent strength[24].

The American and South Korean forces were not well equipped, trained well, equipped well and had poor morale, unlike their opponents[25]. The North Korean People’s Army was a force of combat veterans of World War II and the Chinese Civil War who were fervently motivated and well equipped[26]. Thus, in the beginning, the South Koreans and then their American allies were pushed back farther and farther, until they had their backs to the sea in what became known as the “Pusan Perimeter.”

There, the U.S. and ROK forces dug in and the Americans began reinforcing Pusan. Slowly, the situation began to change; American units could feel secure in their flanks and they could fight the type of battle they had trained for. As the American confidence grew, the undisciplined and untrained forces became competent. American officers began to reorganize the ROK Army and soon, the U.N. forces outnumbered the North Korean Army, who had been bled white during the fight to Pusan[27].

Thus, with the situation improved, the U.N. forces were able to push the North Korean invaders back. The amphibious landing at Inchon, a risky gamble for the American Marines--the bulk of troops in the attack, but ultimately it paid off for the U.N. forces, retaking Seoul shortly afterwards and cutting off and destroying a large portion of the North Korean Army. After this success, the allied troops under MacArthur began pushing north, until the unexpected Chinese intervention drove them back below the 38th Parallel. At Chipyong-ni, the American troops defeated the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army and began driving them northward above the 38th Parallel.

The West, deciding to attempt to reach a negotiated peace settlement halted their offensive and backed down to the 38th Parallel. However, the Chinese and North Koreans were not ready to end the war, which they still believed they had a hope of winning if they could out last the U.N. forces, so they took this opportunity to reorganize and dig in. The initial peace talks floundered and the war dragged on for another two years. The Communist forces could not make any headway against the West’s superior firepower and by now the U.S. forces had become a formidable fighting force, but the United Nation troops were also unable to break through the Chinese and North Korean defenses without suffering casualties that were unacceptable to the governments at home. Eventually the Communist situation changed and they no longer felt they could break the will of the United Nation forces and so an armistice was finally signed[28].

This ceasefire, which left the Korean peninsula divided, was bitterly protested by Syngman Rhee, who actively tried to torpedo the armistice talks, and by the Korean people. Both felt that they had spent too much blood for nothing gained by this treaty and were also afraid that the Americans might withdrawal and leave South Korea to fend for itself[29]. On this last point, the Koreans could rest easy, as the Republic of Korea and the United States signed a Mutual Security Treaty, which included an agreement to expand the South Korean Army at American expense and gave long term economic aid with a $200,000,000 down payment and 10,000,000 pounds of food immediately[30]. Thus began the formalized American-Korean alliance, that continues to this day.

When the war had started, there existed “a very shaky relationship” between the Koreans and Americans. This improved dramatically after the Korean War, during which both sides developed a mutual respect and appreciation. The Koreans saw the U.S. troops now as necessary for their independence and realized that the Americans were willing to die to defend their country. Americans for their part lost the attitude that they deserved a degree of deference for freeing Korea “free of charge” after World War II as they saw the Koreans fighting and dying in desperation to defend their country. For both sides, this was an alliance formed in blood[31].

During the war, the United States provided the arms and equipment that the South Korean Army used, but it was still lacking in artillery and armor, which was provided by the U.S. Army. For the U.S.’s part, it had plenty of firepower, but lacked manpower and cultural and linguistic sensibility in Korea[32], which it tried to help fix by using KATUSAs, or Korean Augmentation to the United States Army. This never quite worked the way intended, because many of the Korean soldiers lacked English skills and there was a wide cultural gap between them and the Americans, but it did get Americans and Koreans working together more closely and this program continues to this day[33]. An example of the closeness that could develop between the American and Korean soldiers is of Lieutenant Timothy Donovan, who led partisan forces in North Korea. During one of his actions, he was captured by the Chinese, but his men chose to cross the Yalu River into China and rescue him from captivity[34].

Besides military support during the war, it is also good to remember that the United States also did much during the Korean War to help alleviate the suffering of the South Korean populace. During the war, Civilian Assistance Command “waged a relentless war on poverty and disease[35].” This program was organized by the United Nations, but was staffed mainly by U.S. Army civilian and military personnel. It fed and clothed four million refugees, established health care facilities that treated another three million South Korean civilians, and provided over sixty million inoculations. It also planned and implemented programs that restored water, sanitation and other utilities, constructed and repaired transportation and communication systems, and improved agricultural and industrial production. On their own time U.S. soldiers also built orphanages, clinics, schools and churches, which eventually led to the creation of the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea program. This program mixed American financial aid with voluntary efforts of the American soldiers to construct nearly four thousand facilities by 1960[36].

The American-South Korean Alliance After the War.

When the Korean War began, South Korea was still recovering from forty brutal years of Japanese occupation and the shock of the division of the peninsula. The Korean War threatened all of the progress that it had made. It lost countless lives and $2 billion dollars in property losses[37]. It would be difficult for South Korea to recover and in the immediate future; South Korea was still faced with a communist insurgency, which would finally be crushed for good in 1955 with American aid[38].

Slowly, South Korea began to recover, but Syngman Rhee’s anti-democratic tendencies became too much for the American government to bear politically. His corruption deeply embarrassed the United States, who had gone to war defend South Korea’s freedom and independence[39]. Syngman Rhee was finally deposed in 1960 after the U.S. publicly withdrew its support from him. Until the late 1980s, repressive military influenced governments would maintain power in South Korea[40].

Following Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, a general, seized control in Seoul. The country at the time he took over was heavily dependent economically and militarily on the United States. Park set out to turn this around and today in Korea, he is less remembered for difficulties in the U.S.-Korean relation or his political repressions than for being the father of South Korea’s economic progress. Park took charge of the South Korean economy, copying the successful postwar Japanese system, normalized relations with Japan which was highly encouraged by the U.S. gaining it hundreds of millions in economic aid and many more millions in Japanese investments[41]. It is this normalization of relations with Japan as well as the payment from the United States that Park Chung Hee received in gratitude for the two South Korean divisions he sent to Vietnam that are the external factors which give birth to the economic explosion that has made South Korea the economic powerhouse it is today.

It can be argued that without U.S. monetary aid, the South Korean economy would never have gotten to where it is today[42]. However, there is no such thing as a free lunch, in the real world, you get what you pay for and this was not an act of charity on the United States’ part. Instead it was a repayment in gratitude for assistance rendered by an ally. South Korea sent two divisions to Vietnam that fought with great acumen and distinction[43]. This action not only helped South Korea’s economic standings, but also boosted South Koreans own confidence in themselves and their government. They could see that they were a rising economic power and then with the ability to aid the powerful United States in Vietnam, they could see the growth in their own influence[44].

Since the end of the Korean War, the American-Korean alliance has been a steadfast diplomatic feature between the two countries, cemented by their shared experiences in the war. However, the alliance has seen its fair share of difficulties and continues to see them today. A lot of the troubles that faced the alliance were due to fears that the U.S. would abandon South Korea to communism after the fall of Saigon and the warming of relations with China[45]. However, some of the biggest challenges the alliance faces today, comes from within South Korea—growing anti-Americanism based on distrust and grievances both real and perceived[46].

One major reason that mistrust exists on the South Korean side is that for the entire existence of the alliance, the United States has attempted to lower the cost of the occupation by minimizing troop levels in South Korea, something that throughout the entire period of the alliance, the South Korean government has fought against because it feared that the U.S. would abandoned South Korea[47].

South Korean confidence in the alliance was shaken with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Park Chung Hee saw a great resemblance in Vietnam to the situation in South Korean. Another issue that scared the South Korean government was the U.S. détente with China. Park was very afraid that the U.S. would abandon South Korea like it had Vietnam continued, despite the U.S.’s top army commander’s assurance that he had come to “fight and die to save your country[48].”

It should be remembered that defense of South Korea was no easy duty. In response to the growing power of the South Korean economy, Kim Il Sung tried to reunify the Korean peninsula through an unconventional campaign. South Korean and U.S. forces had to fight a low intensity conflict from 1966 to 1969 that some have dubbed “The Second Korean War. The bulk of the key decisions and technical support was done by the U.S. officers, who made sure however that the ROK forces received credit. This type of support boosted South Korean confidence in their own military’s ability to defend its people. It also demonstrated that the U.S. was certain to act if the North Koreans attacked[49].

Another cause for friction in the alliance is that many South Koreans felt that the U.S. supported anti-democratic regimes in its lust to contain communism. While this is true, it is hard to see what else the U.S. could have done. Even the worst oppressions in South Korea paled in comparison to that of the communist regime in the North, and the U.S. had little choice in who it dealt with in the South Korean government[50]. The men who ran the Republic of Korea, whatever else they might be, were not puppets of the U.S., heeding its every beck and call.

There is also a belief by some Koreans that the U.S. supported the military coup of the early 1980s and its ensuing crack down this, view promoted by the evidence that immediately after his inauguration in 1981, President Reagan invited Chun Doo-hwan for a summit to the White House. However, it is untrue that the U.S. supported the crackdown and Koreans do not give the United States the credit it is due, since this summit was part of the price for saving the life of a future president, Kim Dae-jung then under a death sentence by Chun. Many Koreans also ignore the pressures the United States put on the dictator to allow democratic elections in 1987[51]. Other earlier incidents, such as a blunt and crude message to the Korean government, warning of the repercussions in U.S.-Korean relations, saved Kim Dae Jung’s life earlier in 1973[52].

In recent years, there have been many difficulties between the two governments in maintaining the alliance. Political blundering on both sides, especially during the Bush-Roh period has made the task especially daunting. However, despite these troubles both sides have been able to maintain this alliance and are working keep it relevant in the modern world[53].

Many issues today strain the relations such as the difference in political “values and perceptions” of the two countries, South Korean nationalism, tragedies born out of contact with U.S. Soldiers, a perception in the U.S. that South Korea is weakening its stance towards North Korea[54], and perhaps shame of a proud, independent-minded people, bitter of division and the position they find their country in[55]. All of these issues require serious thinking and level-headedness, and many, such as South Korean nationalism, will require deep soul searching from the South Korean people to solve.

Some issues, like the difference in “values and perceptions” come because the United States and South Korea stand both literally and figuratively in completely different places when looking at the alliance. To South Korea, the alliance is a matter of survival and it looks at the reduction of U.S. forces with alarm, while to the United States, South Korea is a smaller piece in a much larger puzzle, and it must balance its alliance with South Korea with its global security and economic interests[56]. This is a major reason why the South Korean government has fought so hard against reduction of U.S forces in Korea[57].

Another major issue deals with nationalism and, to be blunt, shame. Normally, in a historical paper, it is not customary for the author to write of their own experiences, but in this case, the author believes it warrants it. During this author’s stay in Korea and in his experience talking with South Koreans, it is his belief that there exists a great deal of shame in the situation that South Korea finds itself it. The people that the author has talked to about this highlight a shame that the country was divided up by two foreign occupiers, a shame that the country could not feed itself during the war and required support from America, and a shame that the country requires United States protection for its independence. The author recognizes that this may not be the feeling of all or even many South Koreans, but if it is, this is an issue that the U.S. cannot really do anything about except wait for the South Koreans to make peace with the legacy of the Korean War.

Finally, a major issue that has been a problem for many years has been the presence of American soldiers in South Korea. In the 1980s many returning GIs commented on how welcome they felt by the population[58]. Today, the situation is much more volatile, with many tragic accidents, such as the inadvertent deaths of two Korean girls in 2002 at the hands of U.S. soldiers driving heavy equipment. This accident has come to symbolize the oft repeated claim the American soldiers in Korea commit crimes and are not punished because of the special judicial treatment they receive. Unfortunately for all involved, cases like this one, which sparked massive protests and anti-Americanism in South Korea are the result of misunderstandings of things such as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and South Korea. This in turned is caused by “Korean government and incomplete media reporting,” and sensationalization by anti-American activities which breeds resentment and difficulties for the alliance[59]. These kind of problems can really only be solved if the Korean media and government do a better job of portraying the facts about the incidents and combat the activist who sensationalize the issues[60].

Conclusion.

The Korean-American relationship was born in misunderstanding, resentment, and distrust. The Korean War would strengthen the relationship and forge an alliance in blood. Though the alliance has not always had an easy time of, it has lasted for the past sixty years. The reason for this is that despite all the mismanaging, blundering, political rhetoric, and emotion rationality and realism has triumphed[61]. The U.S.-ROK alliance is one of the most enduring and formidable alliances in the world, which has helped preserve peace and stability in North East Asia[62] and it must continue to do so

Both South Korea and the United States need to cooperate together to face problems such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the eventual reunification of the peninsula. South Korea has to expand its international affairs past a survival perspective to a more global outlook to help make the relationship work in the future. On the other hand, the United Sates needs to learn and understand the Korean cultural history and situation that create the South Korean foreign policy[63]. Both sides must reach out to each other to make it work.

Fortunately, both sides realize the necessity and importance of maintaining the alliance and understand the critical role it will play in the near future[64]. Through all the emotion and turbulence in the alliance, South Korean leaders feel that their country’s destiny lies with the United States and thus cooperate with the American leaders. America for her part have grown beyond the feeling that “given all the blood and treasure in the war, abandonment [of South Korea] was not an option,” to a respect of their partner’s strategic importance and capabilities[65]. Thus, the South Korea-American alliance will continue to weather the storms and will continue to survive into the new century.


Bibliography.

Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942- 1976. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2007.

Bolger, Daniel P. Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969. Leavenworth Papers 19. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History, 50th Anniversary Edition. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000.

Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Korea: A Contemporary History. New York: Basic Books, 1997.

Seol, Magdalena J. “The Future of the U.S.-Korean Alliance: Emerging into the Post-Modern International Politics,” Winning Essay for Lint Center 2009 Eekwon Lee and Jongja Byun Scholarship, http://www.lintcenter.org/2009/US-Korea-Alliance.pdf.pdf, accessed January 5, 2010.

Snyder, Scott. “A Call for Justice and the US-ROK Alliance,” PacNet 53A. Honolulu: Pacific Forum, CSIS, December 18, 2002.

Stueck, William, PhD., “The American Presence in Korea: Then and Now.” Lecture, Brooks E. Kleber Readings in Military History, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, date unknown, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/AHEC/mediagallery/videoGallery.cfm?id=34#nogo, accessed December 28 2009.



[1] T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War Histor 50th Anniversary Edition. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000) 10-11.

[2] Max Hastings. The Korean War. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987) 24.

[3] Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. (New York: Basic Books, 1997) 4-5.

[4]Fehrenbach. 16.

[5] Hastings, 26-7, 28.

[6] Ibid. 16-7, 20.

[7] Fehrenbach, 49.

[8] Hastings, 15-6, 18-9, 20

[9] Fehrenbach, 67, 70-1.

[10] Hastings, 333.

[11] Fehrenbach, 30.

[12] Hastings, 19. 50, 58. These numbers have not been adjusted for any inflation from the late 1980s.

[13] Oberdorfer, 6-7.

[14] Fehrenbach, 30-1.

[15] Hastings, 29, 34, 42

[16] Ibid. 33-4, 36, 43-4.

[17] William Stueck, PhD., “The American Presence in Korea: Then and Now.” (lecture, Brooks E. Kleber Readings in Military History, date unknown), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/AHEC/mediagallery/videoGallery.cfm?id=34#nogo (accessed December 28, 2009).

[18] Hastings, 33-34, 43, 53.

[19] Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2007). 85-7, 98, 102-3.

[20] Hastings, 333, 336.

[21] Stueck.

[22] Hastings, 342.

[23] Fehrenbach, 34-5.

[24] Fehrenbach, 36-7, 49, 52,59.

[25] Hastings, 52

[26] Birtle, 98-99; Hastings 52-3.

[27] Fehrenbach, 108-110, 113

[28] Ibid. 266, 337, 342-33, 442-3, 448

[29] Hastings, 322-3

[30] Fehrenbach, 446-7

[31] Stueck.

[32] Birtle, 103.

[33] Fehrenbach 148-9.

[34] Obituary of Timothy Donovan, The Columbia Tribune, September 12, 2009. http://m.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/sep/12/timothy-donovan-19292009/ accessed January 5, 2010.

[35] Birtle, 111.

[36] Ibid., 111-2.

[37] Oberdorfer, 10.

[38] Birtle, 115.

[39] Stueck.

[40] Hastings, 343.

[41] Oberdorfer, 32-4.

[42] Stueck.

[43] Hastings, 343.

[44] Daniel P. Bolger, Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969, Leavenworth Papers 19 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991) 25.

[45] Oberdorfer, 64.

[46] Magdalena J. Seol, “The Future of the U.S.-Korean Alliance: Emerging into the Post-Modern International Politics,” Winning Essay for Lint Center 2009 Eekwon Lee and Jongja Byun Scholarship, http://www.lintcenter.org/2009/US-Korea-Alliance.pdf.pdf (accessed January 5, 2010) 1.

[47] Stueck.

[48] Oberdorfer, 12-3, 61, 64.

[49] Bolger, XIII, 3, 5, 15.

[50] Hastings, 339-40.

[51] Stueck.

[52] Oberdorfer, 42-3.

[53] Stueck.

[54] Seol, 2; Choe Sang-Hun, “An Anger in Korea Over More Than Beef,” The New York Times, June 12, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/asia/12seoul.html?pagewanted=1 accessed January 6, 2010; Scott Snyder, “A Call for Justice and the US-ROK Alliance,” PacNet 53A (Honolulu: Pacific Forum, CSIS, December 18, 2002) 1; Nirav Patel, "Future of the ROK-US Alliance," The Korea Times, Opinion, February 2, 2009. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/02/137_39778.html , accessed January 6, 2010.

[55] Oberdorfer, 8.

[56] Seol, 2.

[57] Stueck.

[58] Hastings, 342.

[59] Snyder, 1.

[60] Ibid., 1.

[61] Stueck.

[62] Patel.

[63] Seol, 2-3.

[64] Patel.

[65] Stueck.