Paper's are done and graded

Got an A on both the Kazakhstan and Korean papers.

Dr. Lee's wanting me to rework on the Kstan paper and try to get it submitted and published. This could be exciting. I've decided (for anyone interested) to post what I wrote on Korea (about the U.S.-Korea alliance).

If anyone's interested in seeing my footnates and scholarship, just give me your email address and I'll send you a copy of the full version.

The Korean-American Alliance:

Forged in Blood

Alexander T. Gerges

Summer 2009

Pittsburg State University

Abstract.

This paper is a general overview of the U.S.-ROK alliance, including aid in the Korean War, from before the outbreak of hostilities to the signing of the armistice. It will examine the successes, failures, and impact of the U.S. aid. This will include things such as the supplies and military training that the ROK forces received before the war, as well as the actual U.S. Armed Forces support in the war. It will also look at the problems that faced the U.S. military during the beginning of the war and how the U.S. military was able to overcome them and successfully help defend South Korean independence. Finally, the paper will also look at some of the difficulties the alliance has faced, how both sides have overcome them, and some speculation on the future of the alliance.

Introduction.

The history of the nation of Korea in the past one hundred and fifty years has been a period of extreme difficulty and sorrow for the people of Korea. From the political pressure and brutal occupation by the Japanese in the first half of the 20th century, to the division after World War II, the blood and destruction wrought by the Korean War, this period has left lasting scars upon the two Korean states. In the last forty years, things have improved greatly for people living in what is now the Republic of Korea, or South Korea, because of its enormous economic growth. However, the Korean peninsula remains divided with the people of the so called “Democratic People’s Republic” of Korea living under an oppressive dictatorship and in poverty.

In modern times, there have been three Korean Wars. Each time, foreign powers have fought in the Korean peninsula with destructive results for the Korean people. The wars that mainly led to the Japanese take over was the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1905[1]. In both wars, the Japanese were able knock out a potential rival for dominance in Korea and strip Korea of a possible protector against Japanese aggression.

Throughout Korea’s history, it had always maintained a close relationship with China to its north while treating with its neighbor Japan as more or less equals, despite two invasions during the 16^th century. However, as Korea continued with its traditional rural agricultural society, Japan catapulted itself into the modern world through industrialization and military expansion[2]. On the other hand, Korea’s isolationism was forcibly ended by the major powers, including the United States, Europe, and Japan[3]. Unlike Japan, Korea was unable to modernize itself sufficiently to fend for itself.

With Korea’s possible protection in Asia removed from the equation and any possible help from western powers an ocean away, the Japanese soon made their move in Korea and without any serious outside force to back the Korean king, Korea fell under Japanese control the occupation included repression of the Korean culture and language and would help lead to the lasting division of Korea[4].

The U.S. really had not had planned to get seriously involved in Korea. Instead it became involved more as a way to check communist expansion in Asia towards Japan. The United States proposed a division of spheres of influence along the 38^th Parallel, which the Soviet Union agreed. Had the Soviets disagreed, there was not much that the United States could have done, considering the fact that the Americans had no real presence in Korea, while the Soviets had an entire army in Manchuria[5]. Both superpowers supported governments based upon their own ideologies; the United States supported the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, under Dr. Syngman Rhee while the Soviets supported the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Kim Il-sung. Thus, began the U.S.-ROK alliance.

U.S. -South Korean Relations Before and During the War.

When the Korean War began, South Korea and the United States were not prepared for the struggle that lay ahead of them. The American troops sent to reinforce the South Korean army initially were badly under strength, poorly equipped, improperly trained, over--confident, and far too few for the task at hand[6]. Likewise, the South Korean military was unprepared and by the evening of the 28^th of June, the South Korean army could only account for 22,000 of 98,000 men on the roll on the 25^th. It had all but been destroyed by the North Korean People’s Army[7].

Similarly, the American task force sent during the initial weeks of the North Korean invasion was unprepared for the trail that lay ahead of them. On July 5^th, 403 Americans of “Task Force Smith” had hastily dug in on a road between Suwon and Osan. The soldiers had grown soft from inactivity during their occupation of Japan and were under strength when sent to Korea. They were a token force, attempting to frighten the North Koreans into backing down, however it was unsuccessful[8]. The Americans were attacked by North Korean tanks and quickly overrun. The United States and their Korean allies had no anti-tank mines and were using obsolescent anti-tank rockets that could not penetrate the North Korean T-34s. This lack of sufficient equipment to stop the tanks coupled with rain that prevented the American air force from supporting Task Force Smith, led to their defeat and the task force quickly melted away[9].

Many people are unable to understand how this could have happened, seeing the current strength and power of the United States, often called the world’s sole superpower. Older people, or people more familiar with history might remember the perceived power of America in the immediate post war period and also struggle to reconcile the performance of the American army in the beginning of the war with the image of American power that people are more familiar. It is very true that the American army performed extremely poorly at the beginning of the war[10].

However, it may be this sort of image of America being an unstoppable superpower that led to the initial disaster in the Korean War. Americans at the time were exuberant at the conclusion of the Second World War. They also felt very secure in their monopoly on atomic weapons, economic, and industrial power and so believing that they would be able to rely on this, the American government dramatically slashed defense spending[11]. In 1945, the American military had twelve million men under arms and spent $82 billion dollars. However in 1950, the military had only 1.6 million men and the government was only spending $13 billion[12]. Thus, overconfidence in American’s status and power helped directly lead to America’s unpreparedness in the war.

Furthermore, Americans were unprepared for the situation in Korea and had not planned what to do with Korea after World War II and most American servicemen had no desire to serve there after hostilities had ended in 1945[13]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the U.S. had little strategic interests in maintaining troops in Korea and in the American government it was felt that Korea was not vital to the security of the United States, but a complete withdrawal would have hurt American credibility with Japan, which was vital for security[14]. Thus, a token force of about five hundred advisors was left in Korea to help train the South Korean military to fight a guerilla war going on in the southern region. In fact, the only real interest the American army had in Korea was for Korea to serve as a bastion of anti-communism. The military had grown suspicious of communism in the post World War II and it was hoped that the United States could fight communism in Asia by allowing South Korea to become a successful democracy, to serve as an example against communism[15].

American policy in the post--war would was clumsy, and while the American was hoping to use Korea as an example against communism, the State Department was pulling in the other direction. It felt that a unified Korea under non-Communist rule was unattainable and so wanted a way out; they also did not like Syngman Rhee, who had been able to take power with support from the U.S. military leaders in Korea. This action was done without the approval of the State Department, which did not want to be seen as getting involved in Korean politics[16]. The Rhee regime was repressive and an embarrassment to the United States. The entire situation in Korea was seen as volatile and dangerous with the top American commander in Korea recommending that the U.S. and Soviet Union simply both back out and let Korea settle its political ails and decide its future in its own time. He believed that involvement by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could only exacerbate things and create an even more dangerous situation[17].

This led to reluctance to support the Rhee regime and getting seriously involved in South Korea. Rhee was not a simple puppet; he was strongly nationalistic and vigorously denounced the American approved division of Korea. The U.S. government decided to limit Rhee’s ability to create “mischief” by denying his military armor or heavy artillery and other military equipment because they feared he might try to unite the peninsula through armed force[18].

The military that the United States created for the Republic of Korea was meant to fight a communist guerilla insurgency, which was aided and led by the North Korean leadership and controlled large regions of territory in the southwest. The primary training the South Korean army received was to fight these guerillas effectively and to end the outmoded methods picked up during Japanese occupation. The guerilla insurgency would last through the war, with American troops also having to aid the South Korean forces in fighting the insurgents. Thus, not only was the South Korean army ill-equipped to fight a modern conventional war, it was also untrained to a point which was not lost on Kim Il Sung when making his decision to invade[19].

The arrogance of the U.S. Government that communists would not try any aggressive actions in Korea because of the perceived strength of America and fear of America’s nuclear arsenal combined with the intention of preventing war by limiting the South Korea’s offensive capability was a recipe for disaster which threatened the very existence of South Korea. The five years of neglect of the U.S. military and the crippling of the South Korean military also almost enabled the Chinese and North Koreans to inflect wholesale disaster during the war. Since the Korean War is often seen as the first major test by communist powers against the West, it also can be argued that losing in Korea may have altered the entire course of the Cold War.

Luckily for both the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, once the North Koreans invaded in the summer of 1950, the U.S. was given a simple and obvious casus belli which then allowed them—with military support of the United Nations, to use force to counteract the communist aggression. Without this act of naked aggression, it is highly unlikely that the United States would have been able to marshal the popular support to continue the war to a satisfactory finish[20]. Another result that would be of great benefit to both countries is that the war turned “a very shaky relationship” into a direct military alliance and a mutually beneficial relationship that has stood the test of time and political blundering on both sides[21].

This war has been extensively written about in academic and American military circles, even if the war itself has been mainly forgotten by the public here in America and by younger generations in Korea. For older generations, especially in Korea, the war and the period afterwards still brings about memories and many American veterans of the Korean War who have visited Korea since the end of the war have talked about the gratitude they felt from the older Koreans[22]. So a brief overview is in order.

The North Korean People’s Army invaded the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950. This surprise attack caught the South Koreans and their American allies completely unaware. Furthermore, the North Koreans had infiltrated the South with Communist agents and they knew the location of every South Korean defense unit and then sent overwhelming forces against them. American advisors in Korea were also caught in a difficult position, because they were not sure whether or not they should fight alongside the ROK army, continue advising or withdraw completely[23].

The North Korean invasion was spearheaded by tanks and the South Korean army had no real means of combating them. Many South Korean soldiers threw themselves at the tanks while carrying explosive charges, but this had very little success and the South Korean morale began to shatter. The North Koreans also had Russian built aircraft, which it used against the South, who had no fighters. Seoul soon fell and the ROK army was all but destroyed. The United States was able to secure United Nations support for a joint military operation against North Korea because the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN at the time of the vote and were unable to help out their fellow communists. America was not ready yet to fight a major war; with only ten divisions and nine regimental combat teams, all but one were at seventy percent strength[24].

The American and South Korean forces were not well equipped, trained well, equipped well and had poor morale, unlike their opponents[25]. The North Korean People’s Army was a force of combat veterans of World War II and the Chinese Civil War who were fervently motivated and well equipped[26]. Thus, in the beginning, the South Koreans and then their American allies were pushed back farther and farther, until they had their backs to the sea in what became known as the “Pusan Perimeter.”

There, the U.S. and ROK forces dug in and the Americans began reinforcing Pusan. Slowly, the situation began to change; American units could feel secure in their flanks and they could fight the type of battle they had trained for. As the American confidence grew, the undisciplined and untrained forces became competent. American officers began to reorganize the ROK Army and soon, the U.N. forces outnumbered the North Korean Army, who had been bled white during the fight to Pusan[27].

Thus, with the situation improved, the U.N. forces were able to push the North Korean invaders back. The amphibious landing at Inchon, a risky gamble for the American Marines--the bulk of troops in the attack, but ultimately it paid off for the U.N. forces, retaking Seoul shortly afterwards and cutting off and destroying a large portion of the North Korean Army. After this success, the allied troops under MacArthur began pushing north, until the unexpected Chinese intervention drove them back below the 38^th Parallel. At Chipyong-ni, the American troops defeated the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army and began driving them northward above the 38^th Parallel.

The West, deciding to attempt to reach a negotiated peace settlement halted their offensive and backed down to the 38^th Parallel. However, the Chinese and North Koreans were not ready to end the war, which they still believed they had a hope of winning if they could out last the U.N. forces, so they took this opportunity to reorganize and dig in. The initial peace talks floundered and the war dragged on for another two years. The Communist forces could not make any headway against the West’s superior firepower and by now the U.S. forces had become a formidable fighting force, but the United Nation troops were also unable to break through the Chinese and North Korean defenses without suffering casualties that were unacceptable to the governments at home. Eventually the Communist situation changed and they no longer felt they could break the will of the United Nation forces and so an armistice was finally signed[28].

This ceasefire, which left the Korean peninsula divided, was bitterly protested by Syngman Rhee, who actively tried to torpedo the armistice talks, and by the Korean people. Both felt that they had spent too much blood for nothing gained by this treaty and were also afraid that the Americans might withdrawal and leave South Korea to fend for itself[29]. On this last point, the Koreans could rest easy, as the Republic of Korea and the United States signed a Mutual Security Treaty, which included an agreement to expand the South Korean Army at American expense and gave long term economic aid with a $200,000,000 down payment and 10,000,000 pounds of food immediately[30]. Thus began the formalized American-Korean alliance, that continues to this day.

When the war had started, there existed “a very shaky relationship” between the Koreans and Americans. This improved dramatically after the Korean War, during which both sides developed a mutual respect and appreciation. The Koreans saw the U.S. troops now as necessary for their independence and realized that the Americans were willing to die to defend their country. Americans for their part lost the attitude that they deserved a degree of deference for freeing Korea “free of charge” after World War II as they saw the Koreans fighting and dying in desperation to defend their country. For both sides, this was an alliance formed in blood[31].

During the war, the United States provided the arms and equipment that the South Korean Army used, but it was still lacking in artillery and armor, which was provided by the U.S. Army. For the U.S.’s part, it had plenty of firepower, but lacked manpower and cultural and linguistic sensibility in Korea[32], which it tried to help fix by using KATUSAs, or Korean Augmentation to the United States Army. This never quite worked the way intended, because many of the Korean soldiers lacked English skills and there was a wide cultural gap between them and the Americans, but it did get Americans and Koreans working together more closely and this program continues to this day[33]. An example of the closeness that could develop between the American and Korean soldiers is of Lieutenant Timothy Donovan, who led partisan forces in North Korea. During one of his actions, he was captured by the Chinese, but his men chose to cross the Yalu River into China and rescue him from captivity[34].

Besides military support during the war, it is also good to remember that the United States also did much during the Korean War to help alleviate the suffering of the South Korean populace. During the war, Civilian Assistance Command “waged a relentless war on poverty and disease[35].” This program was organized by the United Nations, but was staffed mainly by U.S. Army civilian and military personnel. It fed and clothed four million refugees, established health care facilities that treated another three million South Korean civilians, and provided over sixty million inoculations. It also planned and implemented programs that restored water, sanitation and other utilities, constructed and repaired transportation and communication systems, and improved agricultural and industrial production. On their own time U.S. soldiers also built orphanages, clinics, schools and churches, which eventually led to the creation of the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea program. This program mixed American financial aid with voluntary efforts of the American soldiers to construct nearly four thousand facilities by 1960[36].

The American-South Korean Alliance After the War.

When the Korean War began, South Korea was still recovering from forty brutal years of Japanese occupation and the shock of the division of the peninsula. The Korean War threatened all of the progress that it had made. It lost countless lives and $2 billion dollars in property losses[37]. It would be difficult for South Korea to recover and in the immediate future; South Korea was still faced with a communist insurgency, which would finally be crushed for good in 1955 with American aid[38].

Slowly, South Korea began to recover, but Syngman Rhee’s anti-democratic tendencies became too much for the American government to bear politically. His corruption deeply embarrassed the United States, who had gone to war defend South Korea’s freedom and independence[39]. Syngman Rhee was finally deposed in 1960 after the U.S. publicly withdrew its support from him. Until the late 1980s, repressive military influenced governments would maintain power in South Korea[40].

Following Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, a general, seized control in Seoul. The country at the time he took over was heavily dependent economically and militarily on the United States. Park set out to turn this around and today in Korea, he is less remembered for difficulties in the U.S.-Korean relation or his political repressions than for being the father of South Korea’s economic progress. Park took charge of the South Korean economy, copying the successful postwar Japanese system, normalized relations with Japan which was highly encouraged by the U.S. gaining it hundreds of millions in economic aid and many more millions in Japanese investments[41]. It is this normalization of relations with Japan as well as the payment from the United States that Park Chung Hee received in gratitude for the two South Korean divisions he sent to Vietnam that are the external factors which give birth to the economic explosion that has made South Korea the economic powerhouse it is today.

It can be argued that without U.S. monetary aid, the South Korean economy would never have gotten to where it is today[42]. However, there is no such thing as a free lunch, in the real world, you get what you pay for and this was not an act of charity on the United States’ part. Instead it was a repayment in gratitude for assistance rendered by an ally. South Korea sent two divisions to Vietnam that fought with great acumen and distinction[43]. This action not only helped South Korea’s economic standings, but also boosted South Koreans own confidence in themselves and their government. They could see that they were a rising economic power and then with the ability to aid the powerful United States in Vietnam, they could see the growth in their own influence[44].

Since the end of the Korean War, the American-Korean alliance has been a steadfast diplomatic feature between the two countries, cemented by their shared experiences in the war. However, the alliance has seen its fair share of difficulties and continues to see them today. A lot of the troubles that faced the alliance were due to fears that the U.S. would abandon South Korea to communism after the fall of Saigon and the warming of relations with China[45]. However, some of the biggest challenges the alliance faces today, comes from within South Korea—growing anti-Americanism based on distrust and grievances both real and perceived[46].

One major reason that mistrust exists on the South Korean side is that for the entire existence of the alliance, the United States has attempted to lower the cost of the occupation by minimizing troop levels in South Korea, something that throughout the entire period of the alliance, the South Korean government has fought against because it feared that the U.S. would abandoned South Korea[47].

South Korean confidence in the alliance was shaken with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Park Chung Hee saw a great resemblance in Vietnam to the situation in South Korean. Another issue that scared the South Korean government was the U.S. détente with China. Park was very afraid that the U.S. would abandon South Korea like it had Vietnam continued, despite the U.S.’s top army commander’s assurance that he had come to “fight and die to save your country[48].”

It should be remembered that defense of South Korea was no easy duty. In response to the growing power of the South Korean economy, Kim Il Sung tried to reunify the Korean peninsula through an unconventional campaign. South Korean and U.S. forces had to fight a low intensity conflict from 1966 to 1969 that some have dubbed “The Second Korean War. The bulk of the key decisions and technical support was done by the U.S. officers, who made sure however that the ROK forces received credit. This type of support boosted South Korean confidence in their own military’s ability to defend its people. It also demonstrated that the U.S. was certain to act if the North Koreans attacked[49].

Another cause for friction in the alliance is that many South Koreans felt that the U.S. supported anti-democratic regimes in its lust to contain communism. While this is true, it is hard to see what else the U.S. could have done. Even the worst oppressions in South Korea paled in comparison to that of the communist regime in the North, and the U.S. had little choice in who it dealt with in the South Korean government[50]. The men who ran the Republic of Korea, whatever else they might be, were not puppets of the U.S., heeding its every beck and call.

There is also a belief by some Koreans that the U.S. supported the military coup of the early 1980s and its ensuing crack down this, view promoted by the evidence that immediately after his inauguration in 1981, President Reagan invited Chun Doo-hwan for a summit to the White House. However, it is untrue that the U.S. supported the crackdown and Koreans do not give the United States the credit it is due, since this summit was part of the price for saving the life of a future president, Kim Dae-jung then under a death sentence by Chun. Many Koreans also ignore the pressures the United States put on the dictator to allow democratic elections in 1987[51]. Other earlier incidents, such as a blunt and crude message to the Korean government, warning of the repercussions in U.S.-Korean relations, saved Kim Dae Jung’s life earlier in 1973[52].

In recent years, there have been many difficulties between the two governments in maintaining the alliance. Political blundering on both sides, especially during the Bush-Roh period has made the task especially daunting. However, despite these troubles both sides have been able to maintain this alliance and are working keep it relevant in the modern world[53].

Many issues today strain the relations such as the difference in political “values and perceptions” of the two countries, South Korean nationalism, tragedies born out of contact with U.S. Soldiers, a perception in the U.S. that South Korea is weakening its stance towards North Korea[54], and perhaps shame of a proud, independent-minded people, bitter of division and the position they find their country in[55]. All of these issues require serious thinking and level-headedness, and many, such as South Korean nationalism, will require deep soul searching from the South Korean people to solve.

Some issues, like the difference in “values and perceptions” come because the United States and South Korea stand both literally and figuratively in completely different places when looking at the alliance. To South Korea, the alliance is a matter of survival and it looks at the reduction of U.S. forces with alarm, while to the United States, South Korea is a smaller piece in a much larger puzzle, and it must balance its alliance with South Korea with its global security and economic interests[56]. This is a major reason why the South Korean government has fought so hard against reduction of U.S forces in Korea[57].

Another major issue deals with nationalism and, to be blunt, shame. Normally, in a historical paper, it is not customary for the author to write of their own experiences, but in this case, the author believes it warrants it. During this author’s stay in Korea and in his experience talking with South Koreans, it is his belief that there exists a great deal of shame in the situation that South Korea finds itself it. The people that the author has talked to about this highlight a shame that the country was divided up by two foreign occupiers, a shame that the country could not feed itself during the war and required support from America, and a shame that the country requires United States protection for its independence. The author recognizes that this may not be the feeling of all or even many South Koreans, but if it is, this is an issue that the U.S. cannot really do anything about except wait for the South Koreans to make peace with the legacy of the Korean War.

Finally, a major issue that has been a problem for many years has been the presence of American soldiers in South Korea. In the 1980s many returning GIs commented on how welcome they felt by the population[58]. Today, the situation is much more volatile, with many tragic accidents, such as the inadvertent deaths of two Korean girls in 2002 at the hands of U.S. soldiers driving heavy equipment. This accident has come to symbolize the oft repeated claim the American soldiers in Korea commit crimes and are not punished because of the special judicial treatment they receive. Unfortunately for all involved, cases like this one, which sparked massive protests and anti-Americanism in South Korea are the result of misunderstandings of things such as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and South Korea. This in turned is caused by “Korean government and incomplete media reporting,” and sensationalization by anti-American activities which breeds resentment and difficulties for the alliance[59]. These kind of problems can really only be solved if the Korean media and government do a better job of portraying the facts about the incidents and combat the activist who sensationalize the issues[60].

Conclusion.

The Korean-American relationship was born in misunderstanding, resentment, and distrust. The Korean War would strengthen the relationship and forge an alliance in blood. Though the alliance has not always had an easy time of, it has lasted for the past sixty years. The reason for this is that despite all the mismanaging, blundering, political rhetoric, and emotion rationality and realism has triumphed[61]. The U.S.-ROK alliance is one of the most enduring and formidable alliances in the world, which has helped preserve peace and stability in North East Asia[62] and it must continue to do so

Both South Korea and the United States need to cooperate together to face problems such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the eventual reunification of the peninsula. South Korea has to expand its international affairs past a survival perspective to a more global outlook to help make the relationship work in the future. On the other hand, the United Sates needs to learn and understand the Korean cultural history and situation that create the South Korean foreign policy[63]. Both sides must reach out to each other to make it work.

Fortunately, both sides realize the necessity and importance of maintaining the alliance and understand the critical role it will play in the near future[64]. Through all the emotion and turbulence in the alliance, South Korean leaders feel that their country’s destiny lies with the United States and thus cooperate with the American leaders. America for her part have grown beyond the feeling that “given all the blood and treasure in the war, abandonment [of South Korea] was not an option,” to a respect of their partner’s strategic importance and capabilities[65]. Thus, the South Korea-American alliance will continue to weather the storms and will continue to survive into the new century.

Bibliography.

Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942- 1976. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2007.

Bolger, Daniel P. Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969. Leavenworth Papers 19. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History, 50^th Anniversary Edition. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000.

Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Korea: A Contemporary History. New York: Basic Books, 1997.

Seol, Magdalena J. “The Future of the U.S.-Korean Alliance: Emerging into the Post-Modern International Politics,” Winning Essay for Lint Center 2009 Eekwon Lee and Jongja Byun Scholarship, http://www.lintcenter.org/2009/US-Korea-Alliance.pdf.pdf, accessed January 5, 2010.

Snyder, Scott. “A Call for Justice and the US-ROK Alliance,” PacNet 53A. Honolulu: Pacific Forum, CSIS, December 18, 2002.

Stueck, William, PhD., “The American Presence in Korea: Then and Now.” Lecture, Brooks E. Kleber Readings in Military History, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, date unknown, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/AHEC/mediagallery/videoGallery.cfm?id=34#nogo, accessed December 28 2009.

---

[1] T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War Histor 50^th Anniversary Edition. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000) 10-11.

[2] Max Hastings. The Korean War. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987) 24.

[3] Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. (New York: Basic Books, 1997) 4-5.

[4]Fehrenbach. 16.

[5] Hastings, 26-7, 28.

[6] Ibid. 16-7, 20.

[7] Fehrenbach, 49.

[8] Hastings, 15-6, 18-9, 20

[9] Fehrenbach, 67, 70-1.

[10] Hastings, 333.

[11] Fehrenbach, 30.

[12] Hastings, 19. 50, 58. These numbers have not been adjusted for any inflation from the late 1980s.

[13] Oberdorfer, 6-7.

[14] Fehrenbach, 30-1.

[15] Hastings, 29, 34, 42

[16] Ibid. 33-4, 36, 43-4.

[17] William Stueck, PhD., “The American Presence in Korea: Then and Now.” (lecture, Brooks E. Kleber Readings in Military History, date unknown), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/AHEC/mediagallery/videoGallery.cfm?id=34#nogo (accessed December 28^, 2009).

[18] Hastings, 33-34, 43, 53.

[19] Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2007). 85-7, 98, 102-3.

[20] Hastings, 333, 336.

[21] Stueck.

[22] Hastings, 342.

[23] Fehrenbach, 34-5.

[24] Fehrenbach, 36-7, 49, 52,59.

[25] Hastings, 52

[26] Birtle, 98-99; Hastings 52-3.

[27] Fehrenbach, 108-110, 113

[28] Ibid. 266, 337, 342-33, 442-3, 448

[29] Hastings, 322-3

[30] Fehrenbach, 446-7

[31] Stueck.

[32] Birtle, 103.

[33] Fehrenbach 148-9.

[34] Obituary of Timothy Donovan, The Columbia Tribune, September 12, 2009. http://m.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/sep/12/timothy-donovan-19292009/ accessed January 5, 2010.

[35] Birtle, 111.

[36] Ibid., 111-2.

[37] Oberdorfer, 10.

[38] Birtle, 115.

[39] Stueck.

[40] Hastings, 343.

[41] Oberdorfer, 32-4.

[42] Stueck.

[43] Hastings, 343.

[44] Daniel P. Bolger, Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969, Leavenworth Papers 19 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991) 25.

[45] Oberdorfer, 64.

[46] Magdalena J. Seol, “The Future of the U.S.-Korean Alliance: Emerging into the Post-Modern International Politics,” Winning Essay for Lint Center 2009 Eekwon Lee and Jongja Byun Scholarship, http://www.lintcenter.org/2009/US-Korea-Alliance.pdf.pdf (accessed January 5, 2010) 1.

[47] Stueck.

[48] Oberdorfer, 12-3, 61, 64.

[49] Bolger, XIII, 3, 5, 15.

[50] Hastings, 339-40.

[51] Stueck.

[52] Oberdorfer, 42-3.

[53] Stueck.

[54] Seol, 2; Choe Sang-Hun, “An Anger in Korea Over More Than Beef,” The New York Times, June 12, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/asia/12seoul.html?pagewanted=1 accessed January 6, 2010; Scott Snyder, “A Call for Justice and the US-ROK Alliance,” PacNet 53A (Honolulu: Pacific Forum, CSIS, December 18, 2002) 1; Nirav Patel, "Future of the ROK-US Alliance," The Korea Times, Opinion, February 2, 2009. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/02/137_39778.html , accessed January 6, 2010.

[55] Oberdorfer, 8.

[56] Seol, 2.

[57] Stueck.

[58] Hastings, 342.

[59] Snyder, 1.

[60] Ibid., 1.

[61] Stueck.

[62] Patel.

[63] Seol, 2-3.

[64] Patel.

[65] Stueck.

Wrapping up loose ends

Well, I guess I can officially call this summer to a close as I've just submitted my paper on Central Asia through email to Dr. Lee. I've already given him my Korean paper, so all that's left to do is wait for him to grade the stuff and get back to me. For the Korean paper I did a piece on the US-Korean alliance and for Kazakhstan I did something about Foreign (mainly US) interests in Central Asia. Ironically I went into these two papers confident about US-Korean relationship and worried about Central Asia, but I came out worried about Korea and more comfortable with the power plays in Central Asia.

While I eventually do go to say in my Korean paper that the US-Korean alliance will still be maintained, I'm really very afraid of the way South Korea is currently going with anti-American attitudes and the lack of concern I see in the people my age about North Korea. If I'm being harsh on young Koreans, I apologize, but that's what I see in the students who come here. North Korea isn't really a threat in their minds and they feel that North Korea may be right in many areas. I've known several who say it might be true when North Korea says that the U.S. invaded North Korea first starting the Korean war. How serious they are about this is something I'm not sure of, but the fact that they are even able to consider it as a possibility is quite astounding considering the historical evidence against it and the way North Korea has operated in the past with its lies and propaganda.

I guess I just don't understand the mind of the people over there. A lot of time I see people out there protesting the U.S. presence there, which has always struck me as a bit of ingratitude. I've been told it is a thing about national pride, but still, if I had a hostile neighbor like that who has invaded my country and sent terrorists against me, I'd like to think that I would swallow my pride and accept a bit of help. Furthermore, you don't really see this same scale of anti-Americanism in Germany. I'm sure there's less troops there, but we still have a lot of troops in Germany and for a reason much less in Germany's national interests than defense against an enemy less than forty km from its capitol.

In what I've read though, it is always the government of Korea that tries to preserve the relationship with the U.S. so maybe it isn't a Korean thing, but a thing about youth. I know many American kids my age are ignorant and apathetic about what is going on around them, so what's really to make South Korean kids different? Maybe I'm just a crotchety old man on a soap box deep at heart...

Anyone actually surprised that Iran's big surprise to the west had to deal with nuclear technology?

For Auld Lange Syne!

Inspired heavily by JP's touching new year's note, I've decided to follow suit in a way. I’ll be giving shout outs to the people who have helped make 2009 one of the most memorable years of my life and tacking on a sort of resolutions—something I’ve never really taken seriously, but we’ll see how it turns out. As noted by JP, this’ll probably be a bit rambly and you may just want to CTRL F to your spot to ignore other parts. For people tagged in this, I apologize if I lump you in with a group of people instead of giving you an individual paragraph, I mean no offense by it; it’s just bad luck that my train of thought missed your station.

At the very least, 2009 has been an eventful year. I’ve gone farther away from home for longer than ever before. I’ve added South Korea and Russia to countries I’ve visited and I’m extremely pleased to add Kazakhstan to “places I have lived.” I’ve finally started to get myself into a decent physical fitness shape, break out a bit of my shell and attend a few parties this semester (for better or worse), completed two more of my reenacting impressions, start a club, become a Cadet Liaison Officer (somehow?), essentially get and break up with my first girlfriend, and get contracted with the United States Army.

To all the people that I have met on these trips and made the trips memorable, but especially to you who have helped me out in my time abroad, I am forever in your debt and grateful to have met people like you. So thanks Masha, Ivan, Juliana, Kate, Irina, Yun jin, Cho Hee, Swan, Yuri, Moonki, Yeonju, Elly and all her friends, Soojin, Vicky, Layla, Damy, Alyona, Simbat, Aliya, Nazym, Zhanara, Valentina, Zarina, Dias, Dauren, Nursaltan, all the Medinas, all the Asels, Dilbar, Max, Rabiga, Nastya, and all my students from Kazakhstan. The year wouldn’t have been the same without you guys. It’s a pity most of my friends in Kazakhstan won’t read this and the email addresses don’t work. Such is life I guess.

Keeping on the subject of trips, two more big shout outs: Jake and Elly.


Jake, thanks for coming with me on our little expedition to Asia. The trip wouldn’t have been the same without you. It was really good to have some company to blare Gogol Bordello or some melancholy music on a Friday or Saturday night and then get the evil eyes from the old ladies who sat outside our flat, or aid in our attempts to keep ourselves fed this summer. The fried cookies recipe has kind of caught on with at least one of my friends. Sorry mate if I was short with you at all this summer. It was no picnic teaching out there sometimes, but you know that as well as I.

Elly—this is going to have to break a bit away from the travel log I’ve got going here. Firstly, I want to apologize for my rudeness in the immediate aftermath (and a bit longer) of our break up. What happened between us is bygone and was no excuse for my behavior afterwards. I’m really glad we’ve been able to remain friends though. Being with you has definitely helped me mature in a lot of ways, especially in how I deal with girls and emotional things. I appreciate you being there for me when I had a rough time of it last winter. The biggest thing I want to do is thank you for opening up your home and family to me and Jake. Without the hospitality and your friends, we wouldn’t have been able to stick around in Korea any longer and I may have never had a chance to see the U.N. Cemetery in Busan. Please pass on your thanks to your family, your friends who put up with us, and especially your sister for translating (almost) everything for us. Apologize to them for me about any problems I might have caused and if I made myself look like a stupid drunk.

All right, now that we’ve gotten those two big ones out of the way, I really want to thank everyone in ROTC who worked with me and encouraged me to keep working out and trying. I can’t believe that I’ve come this far, PT wise; for those of you who remember me from high school, you know how tough a road I’ve had getting here. I really want to give a shout out to Dillow for those excellent ranger challenge PTs. Baier, I also want to thank you for pacing me for that PT test after ranger challenge. You didn’t have to do it man, but you helped make sure I kept a passing speed. It really helped me out mates. Without all you guys’s support, I don’t know if I would have been able to push on and contract with the army. Be patient with me guys, I still have a long way to go, to get ready for LDAC, I’ll do my best to work on all those things from that evaluation.

Speaking of ROTC, Brinkman, I want to thank you for making sure I got home safely after that beginning of the year ROTC party. Thank you very much for talking with me about some of the concerns I had about continuing with ROTC and joining the army. You’re a good guy; I hope we’ll still be able to wargame with Dustin before you leave to do your service, Sah!

My fellow Royal Banana Republicans—it was a good year for all of us, wouldn’t you say? Bezzek, you had a wonderful experience abroad and actually landed that model girlfriend you were always predicting about. Hit me up when you’ve made sure that absinthe you are brewing won’t make someone blind! JP—that Robin Sage thing sounds like a dream come true for you and I’m also very glad that you fixed your video game addiction. It’s really a pity you couldn’t have come back to K-stan again; our trip there was a blast this year. We’re more in common than you know now; somehow I’ve offended Naila, so I’m persona non-grata in Semey :(. Ah, well. I guess you can’t win ‘em all.

Nate! It’s been a long time since we were hanging out after school in 8th grade playing Age of Empires II through lan or something. I’m really glad we still keep in touch. We have to make sure we’ll continue to do so man. Sorry I haven’t been online lately. I’m sort of getting out of multiplayer shooters sadly…


A new year brings new friends and so I have to thank you Newbanks. To be honest, I’m not completely sure how we got to hanging out. Somehow we both realized we liked Hearts of Iron and the rest is history I guess. Anyway, it’s been a blast hanging out with you and conquering the world and it’s been especially nice to have you around because you make me look like a rational, open-minded person, instead of a national chauvinist. Appreciate it bud; just try to stop getting so angry at society and people. Also, don’t be a nazi pedophile. Is bad.

All right this is getting really long, so I’ll try to wrap it up:

Johannes—mate thanks for coming to Pittsburg. ROTC was a lot of fun with you there and thanks for helping out our poor ranger challenge team. What’ll we do without you? Seriously though, it was great having you here in the U.S. and I had a blast hanging out with you and Heini the last week or so. Sorry if I bugged you or made off color jokes about WWII—that little bit I did about the sack of Berlin got me unfriended by my boss from Kazakhstan…

To everyone who came to my “surprise” party this year, thank you so much guys. I’ve never actually had a party with friends on my birthday because it’s so inconvenient for everyone. You guys taking the time do that really helped me out and so I didn’t get into the normal black mood I have around my birthday.

So in the end; I want to say thanks for putting up with me another year guys. Sorry if I pissed you guys off (cough: Yuri, Elly, Johannes, Alena—note here, I’m apologizing for being a jerk at the party, but not apologizing for what I said! Dammit, I still maintain that that Dima misheard me, but might I recommend you read Robert Conquest’s “Stalin: Breaker of Nations?”). Thanks for making 2009 one of the best years of my life all!


Now for resolutions—I’m not usually a fan of this, but I’ll give it a go, because I hope it’ll help keep me straight and working on this. You don’t really have to read this, it’s more for me to remember what my goals are this year.
1. I’ve gotten farther along than I ever thought possible PT wise, but I have to keep pushing myself. I need to keep working on the run and strength, but I’d think it’s important for me to cut back on how much I eat and watch what I eat—steps to do this: one plate at the d-hall and cut sweets. More salads with less dressing.
2. Confidence…that was the big thing I got docked for from my peer evaluations…so I should work on this, I guess.
3. LDAC prep and general armyness: just got to buckledown and start taking this more serious. More OPORD, More PT, more military bearing, and dammit more studying the book.
4. Russian language: actually attend classes this semester and work on Rosetta stone.
5. Stop getting so worried about everything. Just take it a day at a time and not worry about things I change—US politics, problems facing Americans, problems with the interpretation of history…
6. Stop having to win arguments. Yeah, I get told I’m pigheaded and I don’t drop things. So I’m resolving to learn to live with other people being wrong :P. Meaning, even if I know I’m right in an argument, at least once in a while just dropping it—without having to get the last word in or causing problems.

Happy New Year Folks!

Hello again! Plus An article about my current foreign policy fears.

Well, it certainly has been a while since I've updated here, hasn't it? Semester's almost completely over with and I have some more free time so I thought I might update this blog since I used this note for facebook too. Before I get to that, I just want to say that I've had an incredibly odd semester, with many ups and downs, but it appears to be winding up on a high note. I've officially contracted with the army now and I just passed my PT test with my score ever.

I'd also like to apologize, because looking back on this I did get a bit emotional in some of my rants posts. I was surprised, and a little embarrassed to actually be contacted through email about this blog--for questions about working at the SSPI, which while flattering, also means I'm actually getting a few non-family readers. Now I understand that its possible, I just didn't figure on anyone outside my family/friends radius actually bothering to read this stuff. If I do continue to post here, I will attempt to keep this a bit more professional (?) and less personal.

Anyhow, back to my main reason for posting, an interesting article from Victor Davis Hanson, which sums up a lot of my concerns in the current political climate for the US and its image abroad.

So, in my travels this summer, I had a lot of questions about what I thought about Barack Obama and his presidency. To be honest, I've gotten the feeling that to the world Obama is hugely popular, but for little reason. When I came from Kazakhstan back to Korea, I was told that the phrase "That's so Obama!" Meant "That's so cool." Apparently, in the US "Obama" had become synonymous for cool. I'm not sure where this idea came from, I never heard it in the U.S. when I returned and I never really got a good explanation about why they liked Obama so much, other than he wasn't Bush and he promised "Change" (though, in their defense, I spoke no Korean, and in the family I stayed with, only one of them spoke any English and it was very basic, so we had a difficult time communicating. Plus, they weren't the most political people and they may have been trying to be polite.)

I have to say I'm worried we are looking like the U.S. will run out on its allies if put into a tough spot simply to try to appease people and countries that will never be happy with the U.S. at all. If anyone has watched my link on the Korea-US alliance, I have a feeling there is something to this: public opinion over in Korea may be against the U.S. often, but "the alliance survived because rationality triumphed over ideology and emotion."

Even Roh, who was elected on a anti-U.S. position ended up being able to work with Bush, one of the least popular U.S. presidents internationally and so called "the least capable president in terms of handling the alliance" and in many ways the ties to the US-ROK alliance increased. But further than that, while many South Koreans demonstrate against the US military presence there, the South Korean government has actively lobbied against US plans to draw down forces to a token level throughout the entire history of the alliance.

Believe me, I am very grateful for the fact that the world seems to have a better opinion of the US because of Obama's election. I'm just worried he's sacrificing our obligations to certain countries in favor of trying to become liked by other countries that will never be satisfied with us.

"December 7, 2009
Riding the Back of the Tiger
by Victor Davis Hanson
Pajamas Media

…is what America has done since 1941. Obama wants to get off. Fine. Many of our countrymen are tired of the ride. But what makes him think that on the ground with the gnashing beast is any safer than on his back?

What Causes Wars?

I do not mean here the existential reasons for strife, brought about through pride, status, envy, honor — or even the supposed desire for riches and natural resources. But rather, less grandly, what allows those aggressions to devolve into legalize murder on a vast scale?

I ask that question, because I am not sure our President or his advisors have ever raised it. But in almost every case in the past, wars were not caused by Bush-like ‘smoke-‘em-out’ rhetoric — no more than they were prevented by “reset” button outreach or bowing to thugs or the League of Nations or the United Nations or things like the Wilsonian Cairo speech.

Usually aggression, bullying, and nationalist agendas evolve into wars — when the aggressive party is convinced it has more to gain through war than lose. And such perceptions, wrong or not, emerge when a Xerxes, a Napoleon or a Hitler are assured that their targets either cannot or will not stop them. Or, if they belatedly try to roll the dice, the resulting losses will be small in terms of what might be perceived as gain.

I am not discounting error and miscalculation. Hitler, after all, got more natural resources through purchase from the Soviet Union (a willing ally) for the Reich between late summer 1939 and June 1941 than he ever did by looting Russia between mid 1941 and 1945.

Hitler also would learn that only post facto. By June 1941 he was convinced that given Stalin’s poor performance in the recent Finnish War, the Red Army’s so-so record in splitting up Poland in 1939, and the well known past purges of the Soviet officer corps — all collated with Stalin’s mysterious efforts to placate Hitler, and denials of the impending threat — the Soviet Union would be impotent, like Norway or France. He deemed its finish a 4-5 week cakewalk.

(Remember, Hitler was also using WWI (faulty) analogies: 4 years /defeat in France vs. 2 years /victory in Russia meant 23 years later, a 6 weeks /victory in France would mean 3 weeks / triumph in Russia.

In the Arena

Take a war. Even the trivial can create dangerous impressions.

Korea? Dean Acheson’s inadvertent slip that South Korea lay outside the U.S. protective shield, coupled with (wrong) impressions about Truman, who was on record as wanting to diminish U.S. conventional forces (remember the ‘revolt of the admirals’?) — all that and more helped to convince the communists that the U.S. would not or could not react to aggression, a perception almost confirmed by the time we were encircled at Pusan.

How about the weird Falkland War (‘two bald men fighting over a comb’)? Why would Argentina take on the reputation of the centuries-old British navy over a few windswept rocks?

Let us count the ways: the sinking Argentine dictators needed a nationalist distraction? They thought the new “female” Thatcher would not be so macho? They thought the withdrawal of a British minesweeper from the Falklands would mean that their invasion would be seen as a fait accompli, not as something the far away, supposedly decadent British would fight over.

Hitler could have been stopped during the Rhineland crisis, during the Anschluss, and in Czechoslavakia, given the paucity and vulnerbality of the late 1930s Panzers. But he gambled that the French and U.K. were far more traumatized as winners in the Great War’s killing fields than were the defeated Germans.

What is the point of this pop historicizing?

Like it or not, the fragile postwar order was largely enforced by the U.S. and its Western allies, along with a general understanding that the ‘system’ had allowed a Russia, China, or the Gulf monarchies to thrive through maintenance of the “rules”. We spent trillions because we thought it cheaper for us and the world than what started in 1914 and 1939. And we were largely right.

There was a general recognition among unhinged regimes — a Cuba, Saddam’s Iraq, a Libya, a North Korea, a Syria, Venezuela — that regional aspirations were, well, contained. Redlines were everywhere — Taiwan was sacrosanct; so was South Korea. Israel would not be destroyed. Europe would not face a Russian invasion. And so on. A Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Mao, Kim Il-sung, Gaddafi, Arafat, etc. would be “corralled” and not allowed to destroy the Western-inspired global order.

Not now. Ever so insidiously in just a year, with the best intentions, the President, driven by narcissism, fueled by post-Enlightenment ignorance, is undermining old-fashioned deterrence. Chavez may have called Bush a “devil” and he may appreciate his handshakes with Obama, but an “incident” along the Colombian border is now more, not less likely.

Call him pathetic (he is), but Chavez has visions of a unified South America, communist, totalitarian, and with himself as titular head. He need not invade and occupy Colombia, only bully it, shoot a bit, humiliate it, anything to show his neighbors that he is a little crazy, mean, unpredictable, and worth kowtowing to. He thinks either that Obama will do nothing or cannot do anything, or perhaps contextualizes Chavez’s own socialist indigenous grievances against “them.”

Ditto that soon most everywhere. We bow to the Chinese and think, “Wow, our Harvard Law Review, outside-the-key-three-pointer shooter, looks great as he breezily strides through the majestic hallways and handles his Q&A in full campaign mode.”

They in turn review his apology tours, dithering on Afghanistan, his bows, his trashing of Bush, his past demagoguery of the Iraq war and prior anti-terrorism protocols, his efforts to be liked, and always the soaring debt, and think “Wow, it’s soon time to make some regional readjustments and then remind old U.S. friends and allies, that we, unlike America, are terrible people to have as enemies, but rather loyal and devout friends.”

1979 On the Horizon

So I think we are going to see soon some regional flare-ups, minor in themselves, but terribly important as the world pauses to gauge the U.S. reaction. Syria and Iran feel liberated and think they can act with impunity. Turkey is an emerging regional hegemon. I would not want to be a former Soviet republic — at least if I were consensually governed, pro-Western, and democratic.

If I were in Manila, I’d start learning Chinese; if in Tokyo, I’d think about massive rearmament. I would not wish to be in NATO if east of Berlin — “allies” in the West would (cf. 1939) stay theoretic and distant, enemies would be concrete and proximate.

The survival of Israel now depends on its pilots and missiles, not on any guarantees from the U.S. In today’s currency, what we guarantee is worth about as much as U.S treasury bills, or promises of missile defense for Eastern Europe. If I were an Israeli, I’d either pray for the skill and audacity of the nation’s Air Force pilots, or begin cultivating India, Russia, and China, or that and more.

The problem with all this pessimistic view of human nature is that our elite and anointed smirk at it. They seem to say, “Tsk, tsk, we are 21st-century, Ivy-Leaguers in the postmodern age. The world is no longer like it was in 1914.” I explained all this in my latest piece in Foreign Affairs. “Cell phones and the World Court are the order of the day, not Neanderthal notions of something called ‘appeasement’”. But does anyone think human nature has changed since the Greeks due to improved diet, or that brain chemistry has altered with video games?

A Cautionary Tale

Obama inherited, he did not make the rules — whether he thinks he can hope-and-change them away or not.

He can read all the Paul Krugman’s essays he wants that swear that deficits don’t matter that much, or the borrowing is too small, or that the mega-creditor always supposedly has leverage over the lender (reader: would you rather owe a million or be owed a million?), but that does not make a soon to be $20 trillion dollar debt go away.

Such fantasy does not mean interest rates won’t climb to 5-6% and more, and does not mean that we soon will not be paying a $1 trillion a year in interest to pay back what we owe.

The President can Van-Jones the energy question all he wants, in soaring tones bellowing out “solar, wind, and millions of new green jobs!” But that does not mean that, when the global recovery begins, oil won’t go back to $100 plus a barrel. Indeed, our import tab will grow by leaps and bounds in direct proportion to the new gas and oil we find that remains off limits here at home.

And, yes, again, we can give 100 Cairo speeches, back flip even, apologize to the world for being mean to blacks, Indians, Hispanics, Europeans, Japanese, women, birds, plants, butterflies, whatever. And still an Ahmadinejad, a Chavez or a Putin will not be impressed.

With Bush’s first-term swagger, he may have made things unpopular for America among the masses. But his enemies knew that he would do what it takes to protect the U.S. His friends abroad assumed that the more they hated him publicly, the more privately they counted on his support in extremis.

Now? The more the masses hail Obama, the more overseas elites in private shudder that they are on their own.

And, of course, they are.

©2009 Victor Davis Hanson"

Shipping Up to Nowhere

o boyos, looks like it's been a while no? Lot of stuff has happened; though I suppose you probably guessed that part. I'll go ahead and start with our departure from Kazakhstan.

We stopped working after the 28^th and that day was more of a "Goodbye Party" day anyway. It was fun, but we had too many sweets—I had kind of expected the students to bring more savory stuff, but sweets were the order of the day. That Tuesday was one of our guy's birthday, so we had him and a few more students at our apartment for dinner and some movies. We started with Tropic Thunder; a great movie, one I really enjoy. Unfortunately, that was our movie night's high point; the birthday boy picked the next three…and it was the first three Scary Movies—yuck. I could have gone my entire life without seeing those POS. Nichevo (it is nothing). Jake mainly hung out with Zhanar so I was on my own—I built my tank model, got practice making lagman with one of our students. We also had a farewell tea party at the Institute that Friday when we went to get our pay.

I'm not sure why, but for some reason, it seems to be getting harder for me to say good bye. I seem to be getting too easily attached to people now a-days. I was an Army brat for crying out loud; I've gone to six different elementary schools, a junior high, and a high school. I've lived in eleven different houses, six different states, and two different countries—you'd think I'd be used to saying goodbye, by now. I wish I could stop getting so emotionally involved in people that I've just met and may never see again. It really is a pity and it makes things very difficult for me. Don't know what I'll do.

Photos from our last walk home

Anyway, we left Semey by train, which was a bit nerve wracking since they hadn't bothered to get tickets for us. Instead we were relying on personal contacts that Nailia had within the train station. I was worried, but they were pretty confident that everything would be OK—but they were right. About three people saw us off at the station, besides Zhanara who was coming with us to Almaty. We got on for free and were given a booth (though it looked for a while like we'd be standing up the whole time). Riding a train is a bit of a crazy experience in Kazakhstan. It is very cramped, crowded, and during the day unbelievably hot. The bathrooms are pretty primitive and dump the contents of the toilet straight onto the tracks below you—so never ever walk by railroad tracks in Kazakhstan. At night (if you can open your windows, it'll get cold and when you leave you have to put the bedding and sheets away. Also, you'll need to bring your own food and drink or be prepared to starve unless you by from the venders at each stop. Going by train takes a long time in Kazakhstan because there are a lot of stops. Another thing is that there are some soul-crushingly flat areas that you will ride through, that are literally in the middle of no-where. Yet, for all these faults, I think I'd still prefer to go by train than by plane. That was pretty scary and with the hassle of luggage in Kazakhstan (especially when you have a lot of it!)

We finally arrived in Almaty and then we spent our one day there mainly in the company of Damy, Leyla, and Victoria, the students Jeff, Mark, and I had hung out with last summer. It was good to see them again and they seemed very excited to be spending time with Jake and I. That day we went up the Kok-Tubeh, had lunch at a popular student café, saw the central square of the city and some other sights of Almaty. The girls gave me a present of a CD from a guy called "Oleg Gazmatoff" since I liked Lubeh, they think I would probably like this guy as well—and so far I think they are correct, I'm liking it. I also met with the Kazakh officer's sister and niece who gave me all the stuff they wanted us to take…which was a lot of junk. I was really worried about the weight, because it was so darn heavy.

The next day we went to the airport and after people attempted to hustle us at the airport, I met the officer's subordinate who took great care of us and got us through all the lines really quickly and completely got us past the baggage weight limitation. It was really cool. I've benefited twice now, from corruption in Kazakhstan and I can see how it can be nice if you've got the right kind of contacts, but I think in the end, the problems it causes way outweighs its supposed benefits.

I guess now you are expecting me to go on a long rant about Kazakh/Russian culture and so on and so forth like I did with Korea. I'm sorry to disappoint you, but it won't be exactly like that. There are a lot of problems in Kazakhstan, but to be so nit-picky seems a bit unfair. Most of my complaints about Korea is because Korea is an extremely well developed country and benefited greatly from US support so I expected better than that from them. Kazakhstan on the other hand is a former Soviet bloc country, which was fed on a diet of Soviet lies and propaganda. It is extremely poor, full of corruption and they're still trying to decided whether Stalin was a bad or good guy (about evenly split in my class). Most of my other complaints have to do with the lack of body hygiene, which sounds very petty to complain about and I don't really know how they can fix it—it just seems natural to me to change my clothes everyday and take a bath likewise. So you won't be hearing quite as much complaining about Kazakhstan ways.

What I will complain about is that the girls can be a little too friendly. For example, take a look at these few pictures (pictures coming soon if not up yet). The girls have got their arms in ours or (and you probably can't tell) their hands around our waist—sometimes they put our hands like theirs for a more mirrored look. Now this just isn't one or two girls, but almost any girl there in Kazakhstan will do that for a picture. It means nothing really, but what are two poor, to put it nicely heavy (to put it not so nicely fat), homely Midwestern boys from Kansas supposed to think? It isn't easy, you know?

Dr. Lee always says there's something good about Midwestern kids. More responsible, trustworthy, etc. He's really hard on the Korean kids, but he may have something at least in America, I think. I am kind of a fan of the Midwest and her people. We may not be the coolest and hell, some of us might be hicks, but of anywhere I've been the people here are the least boastful and some of the hardest working, I'd like to say. I hate it when people my age knock on Kansas and complain about it so much; I like it here and I'd much rather live in Kansas than some west (or east coast) latte drinking big liberal city. Bleh—if what I've been hearing from people about Obama and people's obsession with him, I'm extremely glad to be in Kansas. As far as I can tell, he still hasn't really done anything yet.

Also, while I'm on politics—why the hell did we get those two idiots out of North Korea? Anyone stupid enough to try to sneak in illegally to a hostile country that is looking for bargaining chips against us deserves to be left to rot, in my opinion. What did we have to give to get them out? They shouldn't have gone there in the first place and by going there, they put America's strategic goals at risk. What fools! If I do something that stupid and a hostile regime is trying to use me against the USA, leave me be and hopefully I'll learn my lesson—I've read One Day in the Life of Ivan Dennisovich so I think I'll be OK to survive in a gulag—I've learned all the tricks, see?

Leaving Korea

Well, Today's the last day in Korea. This really bites. I know I'm due for a Kazakhstan update, but right now I'm feeling too down to bother with that.

Yeah, I'm going home to see my family, but for what two weeks? Doesn't really matter that we'll be in the same state, I still won't see them in real life, so what's the difference between 300 miles and 3000? So I don't really see that as a very big plus. Not to mention I've got about 50 pages (not exaggerating: Dr. Lee wants 20 for Korea, 20 fo rKazakhtan, and Dr. Zagorski wants 10 for Kazakhstan) due at school this summer. Coupled with the anxiety from ROTC (which I know'll go badly for me next summer) and all the other problems that I'm not really allowed to talk about with the public, I see no reason to be joyous on this home coming. If I'm lucky the plane'll crash while I'm asleep and I won't notice.


Ugh: Update--left Elly's home and finally arrived at Incheon Airport. Computer is acting very strange and horribly slow, unsure why. I now fully apologize for complaining about the army banning flashcards, I can really see why. All those punks in Kazakhstan who plugged into my
computer gave me the computer equivalent of Aids or the Ebola virus.

Also, am feeling really bad (besides the usual, I don't want to go blues), and I am afraid I caught something because I've got a nasty little head ache and sore joints. Ain't got none of the symptoms of the Mexican Influenza (at least Korea's symptoms). Hope fully I'll be able to sleep most of it off.

Also, I feel terribly guilty at the good bye Elly's mother gave me. Crying and saying how wonderful I was...and how grateful she was that I'd be helping her in the future. God it hurts. I don't even know what to think anymore about it. I feel guilty, because I did treat her rather badly this summer and our relationship failing was both our faults, but it seemed to hit her harder. I just don't know anymore.

Anyway, I'll leave you with a good song--assuming my computer can handle it, God it is sucking atm. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Dxhm9iEfo8&feature=fvw

Filler

Hey, no updates yet, I've been very very busy.

I'm still alive and having lots of fun in Korea. A real shame I have to go back to school. I'll try to update later; right now I'm at an internet cafe in Pusan.

Later all!